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CHEATER’S JUSTICE: JUDICIAL RECOURSE
FOR VICTIMS OF GAMING FRAUD
Jordan T. Smith*
I. INTRODUCTION
Legends of extrajudicial “cheater’s justice” dealt upon gaming con-artists
and swindlers have deep historical roots. In the Old West, a card shark may
have been shot on sight.1 Later, when the mob (allegedly) ran Las Vegas, a
hustler might have been given the choice of “hav[ing] the money and the
hammer or [walking] out of here,” but not both.2 Gradually, as gambling
became more socially acceptable and government regulation of it increased,
disputants transitioned from wielding brutish self-help remedies to pursuing
legal retribution.3 Today, courts largely accept that a party cheated in a
gambling game can recover any losses in a civil action without necessarily
being limited to administrative remedies through a state’s gaming regulators.4
*

Mr. Smith is an attorney in Nevada. The views expressed in this Article belong
solely to the Author and do not reflect the views of any employer or client.
1
See People v. Grimes, 64 P. 101, 103 (Cal. 1901) (“The deceased may have
treated the appellant unfairly and unjustly in the matter of the game of cards, but
that treatment gave appellant no legal excuse or justification for taking his life.”);
see also State v. Vansant, 80 Mo. 67, 73–74, 1883 WL 9952, *5 (1883); Johnson v.
State, 10 S.W. 235, 236 (Tex. App. 1888); State v. Shadwell, 57 P. 281 (Mont.
1899).
2
Casino (Universal Pictures 1995); see also United States v. Williams, 641 F.3d
758, 768 (6th Cir. 2011) (“When Sam ‘Ace’ Rothstein directs guards to smash a
cheater’s hand in Martin Scorsese’s Casino, a reasonable person could interpret
that as a threat.”).
3
See I. Nelson Rose, Compulsive Gambling and Gaming Debts, 20 GAMING L.
REV. & ECON. 627, 628–30 (2016) (recognizing “[m]ajor changes” in Americans’
views towards gambling and discussing the gaming industry’s evolution from
“threats” and “cruder” methods of collecting gaming debts to collecting through the
court system).
4
See, e.g., Berman v. Riverside Casino Corp., 323 F.2d 977, 979 (9th Cir. 1963)
(“[T]he common law rule, as of the time of Nevada’s admission to the Union,
appears to have been that one who lost money in a crooked gambling game could
recover in a civil action.”); Erickson v. Desert Palace, Inc., 942 F.2d 694, 697 (9th
Cir. 1991) (“[A] party may assert an action outside the administrative process to
recover gambling losses sustained due to casino fraud” but disputes over alleged
winnings in a legitimate game are considered “gaming debts” under the statutory
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Nevertheless, many facets of litigation against cheaters remain uncertain, and
courts sometimes struggle with the appropriate theory of liability, the role of
administrative remedies, and the proper calculation of damages. The recent
dispute between a professional gambler, Phil Ivey, and the Borgata Hotel
Casino & Spa illustrates these issues and, given the case’s notoriety, the court’s
missteps are likely to influence other cases where victims of cheating attempt to
recover their losses.
In a trio of decisions, the Ivey court misapprehended the established
common law rule that claims to recover losses sustained in a crooked gambling
game sound in fraud, not contract. The court compounded its error, in part,
through an inability to reconcile a wager’s contractual nature with the
fraudulent character of cheating. Wagers between a patron and a casino form a
contract, and the governing statutes, regulations, and game rules supply the
gaming contract’s material terms. These sources always contain express or
implied prohibitions against cheating that are, in turn, incorporated into the
gaming contract. But, contrary to the Ivey court, cheating does not only give
rise to a breach of contract claim for statutory violations. Rather, charlatans
commit fraud by placing their bet—entering into the gaming contract—without
the intent to honor their contractual promise not to cheat. And even though
contractual breach alone cannot establish fraud, direct or circumstantial
evidence that the patron entered the gaming contract without the intent to play
by the rules can establish cheating.
Regardless of the liability theory employed, the Ivey court erred by
rejecting as too speculative the use of expectation or probabilistic damages. The
Restatements and case law approve damage calculations based on the casino’s
statistical advantage on any one roll of the dice or turn of the cards. While luck
is always a factor, odds-based damages are ascertainable to a sufficient degree
of mathematical certainty and, if there remains any doubt about the amount of
damages, the cheater—not the casino—should bear the risk.
II. MARINA DISTRICT DEVELOPMENT CO., LLC V. IVEY
A. Ivey Tips the Odds in his Favor.
In 2012, Ivey and a colleague, Cheng Yin Sun, arranged a high-stakes
Baccarat game at Borgata.5 Baccarat is a game of chance where patrons bet on
scheme and “are confined to the administrative process followed by state judicial
review”); see also Golden Nugget v. Gemaco, Inc., ATL–L–5000–12, 2015 WL
689437 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. Feb. 9, 2015) (holding that courts may interpret
gaming statutes to resolve disputes related to allegations of “illegal” gaming when
regulators decline to act) but see Kelly v. First Astri Corp., 72 Cal. App. 4th 462
(1999) (holding that California’s strong public policy against judicial resolution of
gaming related disputes bars enforcement of gaming debts as well as tort actions to
recover losses from alleged cheating).
5
Marina Dist. Dev. Co., LLC v. Ivey, — F. Supp. 3d —, 2016 WL 6138239, at *2
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the relative value of two hands before the dealer deals from a shoe.6 The
general goal is to bet on the hand that ends up closest to, or totaling, nine.7 The
dealer initially deals two cards to each hand and might deal a third card to
either or both hands, depending on each hand’s value after the deal.8 “Tens,
face cards, and any cards that total ten are counted as zero. All other cards are
counted at face value.”9 Unlike blackjack, neither hand can “bust.”10
Patrons can place three types of wagers.11 A patron can bet on a “banker”
hand, a “player” hand, or on a tie.12 The “banker” hand is not the casino (or
“the house”) and the “player” hand does not represent any patron playing the
game.13 A wager on “banker” is a bet that the banker hand will be closest to
nine; a wager on “player” is a bet that the player hand will be closest to nine;
and a wager on the tie is (intuitively) a bet that the both hands will equal the
same amount.14 “A winning bet on ‘banker’ pays 19 to 20. A winning bet on
‘player’ pays even money. A winning bet on ‘tie’ pays 8 to 1. The house
advantage for Baccarat is approximately 1.06% on ‘banker’ bets, 1.24% on
‘player’ bets, and 4.84% on ‘tie’ bets.”15
Baccarat patrons are known for their superstitious rituals.16 In some game
variations, casinos allow patrons to squeeze, crease, bend, or tear cards (nonreusable), and ask the dealer to let them “peek” at the cards before the deal.17
Because of these unique traditions, Borgata did not become suspicious when
Ivey made five apparently idiosyncratic requests as conditions to playing
Baccarat at Borgata.18 He requested a private pit area, a guest (Sun) to sit with
him while he played, a dealer who spoke Mandarin Chinese, one 8-deck shoe
of purple Gemaco-brand Borgata playing cards for each playing session, and
the use of an automatic shuffling device between shoes.19 Borgata agreed to
these conditions, and Ivey accepted maximum betting limits ranging from
$50,000 to $100,000 per hand.20 Under these arrangements, Ivey visited
Borgata four times over a few months and won $9,626,000.21
(D. N.J. Oct. 21, 2016) [hereinafter “Ivey II”].
6
Id. at *2 n.3.
7
Id.
8
Id.
9
Id.
10
See id.
11
Id.
12
Id.
13
Id.
14
Id.
15
Id.
16
Id. at *9.
17
Id.
18
Id. at *2.
19
Id.
20
Id. at **2–3.
21
Id. at *3.
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After Ivey’s fourth visit, Borgata learned that a casino in London was
withholding millions of Ivey’s winnings from a similar game, played with the
same five conditions.22 Its suspicions aroused, Borgata decided that Ivey’s
requested prerequisites were a ruse to perpetrate a form of alleged cheating
known as an “edge sorting scam.”23 “Edge sorting” arranges the playing cards
to reveal a discrepancy in the pattern on the back of the cards.24 The pattern, in
turn, foretells the value of the cards before betting.25 In this particular case,
under the guise of being superstitious, Sun asked the dealer to turn the cards in
different directions so the pattern would show.26 Sun knew that the automatic
shuffler would not change the direction of the cards between shoes.27 With the
design pattern visible, Ivey was able to acquire “first card knowledge” about
the value of the cards before each deal and was able to increase his bets when
he saw favorable starting cards.28 Using this method, Ivey tilted the odds of the
game from a 1.06% house advantage to a 6.756% advantage in his favor.29
B. Borgata files suit.
Feeling scammed, Borgata filed suit in federal district court alleging “that
‘Ivey’s true motive, intention, and purpose in negotiating these playing
arrangements was to create a situation in which he could surreptitiously
manipulate what he knew to be a defect in the playing cards in order to gain an
unfair advantage over Borgata.’”30 Borgata alleged a variety of claims,
including breach of contract, fraud, conspiracy, and RICO violations.31 The
thrust of Borgata’s breach of contract claim was that each wager contained a
contractual obligation to comply with the New Jersey’s Casino Control Act
(“CCA”) and that Ivey’s and Sun’s failure to do so breached their gaming
contracts (wagers) with Borgata.32 Borgata’s fraud, RICO, and conspiracy
claims were based on similar allegations. For those claims, Borgata asserted
that Ivey and Sun “misrepresented that they intended to abide by the rules of
honest play established and required by the CCA.”33 Borgata also alleged that

Id.
Id.
24
Id. at *3.
25
Id. at *4.
26
Id.
27
Id.
28
Id.
29
Id.
30
Marina Dist. Dev. Co., LLC v. Ivey, 93 F. Supp. 3d 327, 332 (D. N.J. 2015)
[hereinafter “Ivey I”] (quoting Amend. Compl. Dkt. No. 5 ¶ 42).
31
Id. at 332; see also Ivey II, supra note 5, at *10 n.22 (discussing Borgata’s
alternative theories of liability). Borgata also filed suit against the manufacturer of
the cards, Gemaco. Ivey I, supra note 30, at 332 n.3.
32
Ivey I, supra note 30, at 336.
33
Id. at 339.
22
23
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Ivey and Sun misrepresented the reasons for requesting the playing
accommodations.34
Ivey and Sun moved to dismiss the complaint.35 They argued that Borgata
lacked any private causes of action under the CCA.36 They also claimed that, if
they played an “illegal game,” then Borgata’s claims were statutorily timebarred.37 And they contended that the court should dismiss the fraud,
conspiracy, and RICO claims because they did not commit an underlying
fraudulent act.38 Ivey and Sun maintained that they did not defraud or cheat
Borgata because Ivey merely used his keen eyesight to observe information on
the back of the cards that was equally available to other patrons and the
casino.39
In opposition to the motion to dismiss, Borgata asserted that the CCA
precludes only patrons’ claims against casinos and does not bar casinos’ claims
against patrons.40 Borgata also averred that, while Ivey’s conduct may have
violated the CCA, the casino was not attempting to privately enforce the
statutes.41 Instead, Borgata described its action as a common law breach of
contract and fraud case, for which violations of the CCA may constitute
evidence of breach or evidence of fraud.42 Lastly, Borgata clarified that it was
not claiming the game was “illegal,” it was arguing that Ivey and Sun had an
‘“illegality of purpose’ in playing an otherwise lawful game.”43
When ruling on the motion to dismiss, the court threatened to
administratively terminate Borgata’s breach of contract claim as covered by the
CCA.44 The court agreed with Borgata that, since gaming is generally illegal
except where authorized by statute, all gaming contracts contain an express or
implied promise that both parties will comply with the CCA.45 The court
recognized that entertaining Borgata’s contract claim would require
determining whether Ivey’s and Sun’s actions amounted to cheating under the
CCA and therefore whether they breached the terms of the gaming contract.46
But in the court’s estimation, case law precluded it from conducting this
analysis or considering any claim that required an interpretation of the CCA.47
Id.
Id. at 332, 334.
36
Id. at 334.
37
Id.
38
Id.
39
Id.
40
Id.
41
Id.
42
Id.
43
Id.
44
Id. at 339.
45
Id. at 336.
46
Id. at 338–39.
47
Id. at 338 (citing Campione v. Adamar of N.J., Inc., 714 A.2d 299, 308 (N.J.
1998)).
34
35
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New Jersey Supreme Court authority held that, because of the importance of
maintaining stability and uniformity in the casino industry, the legislature
vested gaming regulators with primary jurisdiction over claims involving CCA
interpretation.48 Under this precedent, the Ivey court stayed Borgata’s breach of
contract claim until the New Jersey Casino Control Commission or Division of
Gaming Enforcement administratively resolved it.49
The court left open the possibility that casinos can assert other claims in a
judicial forum—without first resorting to regulators—because the legislature
did not design the CCA to preempt all common law causes of action.50 “The
CCA,” the court noted, “does not create a common law cause of action that
does not otherwise exist[,]”51 and it was because “[t]here is no statutory or
common law cause of action for a breach of an agreement to abide by the rules
of an illegal gambling activity[,]” that the court could not hear the contract
claim.52 The court identified fraud as an available common law cause of action
for casinos victimized by cheating, even if the fraud occurs within the confines
of a regulated game.53
But the court narrowed the permissible factual allegations that it would
allow to support a fraud claim outside the administrative process. As with its
ruling on the breach of contract claim, the court refused to entertain Borgata’s
contention that Ivey and Sun defrauded Borgata by “misrepresent[ing] that they
intended to abide by the rules of honest play established and required by the
CCA…”54 The court also thought these allegations required CCA
interpretations that must first go before gaming regulators.55 To avoid these
administrative entanglements, the court construed Borgata’s fraud-based claims
as hinging on Ivey’s and Sun’s alleged misrepresentations about their purpose
for requesting the playing accommodations.56 So construed, the fraud-based
claims did not depend on an application of the CCA and the court deemed those
claims sufficiently pleaded to withstand the motion to dismiss.57
C. The Court Enters Summary Judgment on Liability.
Discovery did not materially alter the arguments presented at the motion to
dismiss stage, and the case proceeded to summary judgment.58 All parties
agreed that the central issue before the court was whether the “use of the edge
48
49
50
51
52
53
54
55
56
57
58

Id.
Id. at 339.
Id. at 337 n.5.
Id. at 337–38.
Id. at 337 n.6.
Id. at 337 n.5.
Id. at 339.
Id. at 339 n.9.
Id. at 339.
Id. at 342–43.
Ivey II, supra note 5, at *1.
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sorting technique in Baccarat constitutes fair play, breach of contract, or
fraud.”59 Even though the court ruled earlier that there was “no statutory or
common law cause of action for a breach of an agreement to abide by the rules
of an illegal gambling activity,”60 the court determined that it could address
Borgata’s breach of contract claim because the New Jersey regulators still had
not issued a decision.61
After analyzing the CCA, the court ultimately concluded that edge sorting
is a prohibited form of “using” or “possessing” “marked cards.”62 The court
ruled as a matter of law that “Ivey and Sun’s violation of the card marking
provision in the CCA constitutes a breach of their mutual obligation with
Borgata to play by the rules of the CCA.”63 Accordingly, the court granted
summary judgment in favor of Borgata on its breach of contract claim.
Somewhat contradictorily, the court continued to focus on Ivey’s and Sun’s
representations about their motivations for requesting the playing
accommodations and did not also reconsider Borgata’s fraud allegations about
their alleged lack of intent to abide by the applicable statutes and rules when
entering play.64 The court’s evaluation of their motivations stressed the role of
Baccarat’s game rules rather than the statutory scheme.65 Although it earlier
found that Ivey and Sun violated the CCA, the court deduced that “none of the
actual rules of Baccarat were broken” because the rules of Baccarat do not
prohibit players from handling or manipulating cards.66 And because none of
the game rules were broken, Ivey and Sun did not make any material
misrepresentation to Borgata.67 “That Borgata chose to believe that Ivey and
Sun were superstitio[us],” the court explained, “does not amount to detrimental
reliance, when no explanation at all could have resulted in the same course of
Id.
Ivey I, supra note 30, at 337 n.6.
61
Ivey II, supra note 5, at *5.
62
Id. at **6–7. The Author takes no position on whether edge sorting constitutes
impermissible cheating, or permissible “advantage play,” nor does the Author
express an opinion about Ivey’s or Sun’s alleged liability. See Kevin Schweitzer,
Living on the Edge, Sorting Out the Rules: Advantage Play Cuts the Risk of Losing
Money in A Casino, and Puts Players at Risk of Incurring Legal Action, 6 UNLV
GAMING L.J. 324, 332–33 (2016) (describing edge sorting as falling within the
“gray area” “between innocent play and cheating”); see also Jordan Scot Flynn
Hollander, Superstition, Skill, or Cheating? How Casinos and Regulators Can
Combat Edge Sorting, 24 JEFFREY S. MOORAD SPORTS L.J. 1, 6–7 (2017)
(describing edge sorting as an example of the second category of advantage play
within the framework offered by Anthony Cabot and Robert Hannum).
63
Ivey II, supra note 5, at *7.
64
See id. at **7–12.
65
See id. at *9 n.17.
66
Id. at *9. Additionally, the court did not discern a violation of any CCA
provision that requires a finding of fraud. Id. at *7 n.14.
67
Id. at 9. Assuming the court is right that edge sorting is a form of cheating, its
statement that “none of the actual rules of Baccarat were broken” is incorrect. See
infra text accompanying note 149.
59
60
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events.”68 Similarly, the court decided that Ivey’s and Sun’s misrepresentations
were not material because Borgata could have granted or denied their requests
to turn the cards even without an explanation.69
The court also relied on the maxim that a breach of contract alone does not
amount to fraud and further held that “Ivey and Sun did not defraud Borgata in
the legal sense…because their representations did not violate Baccarat’s
rules….”70 The implication of the court’s reasoning is that a violation of
Baccarat’s rules would amount to fraud—but not a breach of contract—while a
violation of the CCA amounts to a breach of contract, but not fraud.71 To reach
this result, the court separated the game rules from the terms of the gaming
contract and separated the CCA from the game rules. The court reasoned that
“Borgata and Ivey and Sun were obligated to follow the proscriptions of the
CCA in order to lawfully gamble in the first place, and then they were also
obligated to follow the rules of Baccarat. Ivey and Sun breached their primary
obligation” but not the secondary obligation imposed by the game’s rules.72 In
the Ivey court’s view, if game rules were part of the gaming contract like the
CCA, representations in conflict with the game rules would merely breach the
contract and would not be an independent basis for a fraud action.
On the record before it, the court did not find a misrepresentation, distinct
from the breach of contract, that violated Baccarat’s rules.73 According to the
court, “Borgata’s argument devolve[d] into a contention that defendants acted
fraudulently because they did not reveal their fraudulent intent. Fraud is not so
easy to prove.”74 The court compared Ivey’s and Sun’s representations to a
play-action pass in football or the “Marshall swindle” in chess—maneuvers
designed to deceive an opponent within the confines of each game’s respective
rules.75 It concluded that “Ivey and Sun’s actions violated the rules of the CCA,
a necessary, material, and mutual term of their contract with Borgata” but they
“did not defraud Borgata in the legal sense…because their representations did
not violate Baccarat’s rules, were not material to Borgata, and no independent
obligation to disclose existed under the circumstances.”76 The court entered
judgment in favor of Ivey and Sun on Borgata’s fraud-related claims and
requested additional briefing on the issue of Borgata’s contract damages.77

68
69
70
71
72
73
74
75
76
77

Ivey II, supra note 5, at *9.
Id. at **9–10.
Id. at *12.
See id. at **11–12.
Id. at *11 (emphases added); see also infra text accompanying note 149.
Ivey II, supra note 5, at *12.
Id. at *10 n.19.
Id. at **11–12.
Id. at *12.
Id.

SMITH FORMATTED 5.22.17.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

Summer 2017]

CHEATER’S JUSTICE

5/30/17 2:23 PM

69

D. The Court Rejects the Application of Expectation Damages.
In its supplemental briefing, Borgata advanced two different measures of
its contract damages.78 First, it offered restitution damages as a way to return
the parties to their pre-wager positions.79 Borgata calculated this amount by
accounting for all the money that Ivey deposited, withdrew, redeemed, and won
at Baccarat.80 Borgata also included an amount that Ivey won during a craps
session purportedly with some of his ill-gotten Baccarat winnings, but Borgata
excluded an allegedly unrelated amount that Ivey lost at craps.81 This figure
totaled $10,130,000.82 Borgata separately requested the return of $249,199.83
in “comps.”83
Borgata’s second damage calculation used expectation damages—“what
Borgata would have won had Ivey and Sun not engaged in edge-sorting.”84
This measure would have added an additional $5,418,311.40 to Borgata’s
recovery by computing what Borgata should have mathematically won if the
casino’s 1.06% banker bet and 1.24% player bet advantages were applied to the
amount Ivey wagered during his four playing sessions.85
The court accepted the restitutionary measure of damages and rejected the
expectation-damage calculation as too speculative.86 The court surmised that
“[a]lthough basic math can calculate Borgata’s potential winnings based on the
house edge, the number of hands played, and the average bet,…the whims of
Lady Luck” make it impossible to determine “whether defendants would have
beaten the odds in a normal game over those four days, by luck or otherwise,
and by what amount.”87 To the court, expectation damages unduly relied on
hypothetical facts.88 Except for the comps, the court awarded the return of all of
Ivey’s and Sun’s winnings, including the amount that Ivey won playing craps
with his Baccarat winnings.89

Marina Dist. Dev. Co., LLC v. Ivey, —- F. Supp. 3d —-, 2016 WL 7246074, at
*1 (D. N.J. Dec. 15, 2016) [hereinafter “Ivey III”].
79
Id. at **1–3.
80
Id. at *3.
81
Id.
82
Id.
83
Id.
84
Id. at *1.
85
Id. at *3 n.6.
86
Id. at *1.
87
Id. at *3 n.6.
88
Id.
89
Id. at **3-4.
78
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III. CAUSES OF ACTION AND ADMINISTRATIVE REMEDIES
A. Fraud is the Proper Common Law Claim to Recover Losses Caused by
Cheating.
Between the motion to dismiss and motion for summary judgment rulings,
the Ivey court flip-flopped on the appropriate cause of action and the role of
administrative remedies.90 At first, the Ivey court relegated the breach of
contract claim to the administrative process while it proceeded with the fraud
claim.91 As the basis for doing so, the court highlighted that the CCA—like
most states’ gaming regimes—does not create a cause of action unknown at
common law.92 The court acknowledged that a common law fraud claim exists
for victims of cheating,93 but “[t]here is no statutory or common law cause of
action for a breach of an agreement to abide by the rules of an illegal gambling
activity.”94 Yet, at summary judgment, the court’s decision rested entirely on
Borgata’s contractual theory of liability and rejected the fraud-based claims
without any examination of the common law.95 The court’s change of liability
theories did not give sufficient weight to the history and nature of the
established common law rule that a party cheated at gambling can recover any
losses through a cause of action for fraud, not breach of contract.
The activity of gambling predates the common law—it “has been present
in all cultures during all periods of time.”96 King Richard II introduced the first
English statute prohibiting any kind of gambling game in 1388.97 The statute
prohibited only laborers and servants of husbandry, artificers, and victuallers
(but not “gentleman”) from playing “hand and foot ball, coits, dice, throwing of
stone keyles, and such other importune games.”98 Subsequent statutes imposed
various other restrictions, but in 1603, the court decision in The Case of
Setting aside, for the moment, whether the Ivey court correctly understood the
nature of the fraudulent misrepresentation. See infra Section III(B).
91
See generally Ivey I, supra note 30 (discussing administrative termination of
contract based claims but allowing fraud based claims to proceed).
92
Id. at 338; see also id. at 337 n.5; Campione v. Adamar of N.J., Inc., 714 A.2d
299, 309 (N.J. 1998) (courts will recognize a casino patron’s private right of action
for money damages if the claim has a common law basis).
93
Ivey I, supra note 30, at 337 n.5.
94
Id. at 337 n.6.
95
See generally Ivey II, supra note 5.
96
See Anthony N. Cabot et al., Alex Rodriguez, A Monkey, and the Game of
Scrabble: The Hazard of Using Illogic to Define the Legality of Games of Mixed
Skill and Chance, 57 DRAKE L. REV. 383, 384 (2009) (stating “gambling has been
present in all cultures during all periods of time.”) (quotations omitted); see also
Richard O. Faulk & John S. Gray, Public Nuisance at the Crossroads: Policing the
Intersection Between Statutory Primacy and Common Law, 15 CHAP. L. REV. 495,
509 n.89 (2012) (“The traditional date marking the beginning of the common law is
1066 A.D., the year of the Norman Conquest.”).
97
United States v. Dixon, 25 F. Cas. 872, 874 (D.C. Cir. 1830).
98
Id. (quoting 11 Hen. IV c. 4 (1409)).
90
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Monopolies made it virtually impossible to outlaw all gaming.99 That decision
held that each game was legal unless expressly prohibited by the legislature.100
In practice, the decision allowed gaming operators to slightly modify each
game to avoid prohibition and the legislature could not outlaw each new
variation fast enough.101 Thus, wagering contracts were effectively valid under
the common law.102
Without the realistic ability to ban all gaming, the Crown restricted its
regulatory efforts to prohibiting cheating and limiting the amount of wagers.103
For example, the Statute of Charles II in 1661 provided that the victim of
cheating “‘by any Fraud, Shift, Cousenage, Circumvention, Deceit, or unlawful
Device, or ill Practice whatsoever’, might recover treble damages, one moiety
thereof for the Crown, by suit within 6 months ‘next after such play’, or suit
might be brought by any other person within one year after the six months
expired.”104 The Statute of Charles II also rendered judicially unenforceable
gaming debts in excess of one hundred Pounds.105 But parties could still
gamble for any amount of ready money, and gaming debts remained
enforceable up to the one hundred Pound limit.106
In 1710, the Statute of Anne further restricted the enforceability of gaming
debts and provided other protections against gaming fraud.107 Its
comprehensive framework rendered void and unenforceable most (but not quite
all) claims to recover unpaid gambling debts.108 Only gaming debts for ten
Pounds or less remained fully enforceable in court.109 Losers of more than ten
Pounds could sue within three months to recoup losses along with their costs of
suit.110 “If the loser did not sue, any other person could sue for treble damages,
one moiety for the suitor, and one moiety for the poor of the parish.”111
See Ronald J. Rychlack, Lotteries, Revenues and Social Costs: A Historical
Examination of State-Sponsored Gambling, 34 B.C. L. REV. 11, 17 (1992).
100
Id.
101
Id.
102
Id.; see also Evans v. Cook, 11 Nev. 69, 74 (1876).
103
Rychlack, supra note 99, at 17–18 & n.31 (1992) (“Cheating has long been a
primary reason for regulating gambling”).
104
See LaFontaine v. Wilson, to Use of Ugast, 45 A.2d 729, 732 (Md. 1946)
(quoting 16 Charles 2, Ch. 7 (1664) (“An Act against deceitful, disorderly and
excessing gaming”)); see also Rychlack, supra note 99, at 17–18.
105
Rychlack, supra note 99, at 18; LaFontaine, 45 A.2d at 732.
106
Rychlack, supra note 99, at 18; LaFontaine, 45 A.2d at 732.
107
See Rychlack, supra note 99, at 19; see also LaFontaine, 45 A.2d at 732.
108
Rychlack, supra note 99, at 19–20; see also LaFontaine, 45 A.2d at 732; Burke
v. Buck, 99 P. 1078, 1080 (Nev. 1909) (describing the Statute of Anne’s
prohibitions as “comprehensive.”).
109
See Rychlack, supra note 99, at 20; see also Barret v. Hampton, 4 S.C.L. 226
(S.C. Const. App. 1807) (“Assumpsit lies to recover money won at play under £10,
if the play be fair.”).
110
See Rychlack, supra note 99, at 19.
111
LaFontaine, 45 A.2d at 732.
99
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Notably, Section 5 of the Statute of Anne decreed that winning more than ten
Pounds by fraud was punishable as perjury with forfeiture of five times the
amount won.112 Courts could also impose corporal punishment for cheating.113
These English statutes were received and incorporated into American
jurisprudence at the Founding.114 Many early American jurisdictions, through
statutes or court decisions, extended the Statute of Anne’s protections by
declaring all wagering contracts illegal and barring all enforcement of gaming
debts.115 In one early decision, the United States Supreme Court observed the
different English and American approaches: “In England, it is held that the
contracts, although wagers, were not void at common law, and that the statute
has not made them illegal, but only non-enforceable, while generally, in this
country, all wagering contracts are held to be illegal and void as against public
policy.”116
Even though American courts treated gaming contracts as illegal, the
majority of jurisdictions continued to permit parties cheated “in a crooked
gambling game” to pursue an action for fraud.117 Judges treated wagers
Id.
See Rychlack, supra note 99, at 19; W. Indies, Inc., v. First Nat. Bank of Nev.,
214 P.2d 144, 151 (Nev. 1950).
114
See Rychlack, supra note 99, at 20 (“As the New World developed, the Statute
of Anne, like other common law doctrines, became part of the law of every state.”);
see also Sigel v. McEvoy, 707 P.2d 1145, 1145–46 (Nev. 1985) (citing Sea Air
Support, Inc. v. Herrmann, 613 P.2d 413 (Nev. 1980); Burke v. Buck, 99 P. 1078
(Nev. 1909); Evans v. Cook, 11 Nev. 69 (1876)).
115
See, e.g., Scott v. Courtney, 7 Nev. 419, 421 (1872) (holding that the common
law right to recover money won at gaming “is burdened with so many restrictions,
that at present it can hardly be said the right exists at all. In the United States,
wagering and gaming contracts seem to have met with no countenance from the
courts, and consequently in nearly every state they are held illegal . . . .”); see also
Tatman v. Strader, 23 Ill. 493 (1860) (stating the Statute of Anne “9 Anne makes
all bets upon games void.”).
116
Irwin v. Williar, 110 U.S. 499, 510 (1884).
117
See Berman v. Riverside Casino Corp., 323 F.2d 977, 979 (9th Cir. 1963)
(citing, among others, Harris v. Bowden, Queen’s Bench, 1563, Cro. Eliz. 90, 78
Eng. Rep. 348; Dufour v. Ackland, 1830, 9 L.J.K.B. 3) (“[T]he common law rule,
as of the time of Nevada’s admission to the Union, appears to have been that [a
defrauded party] who lost money in a crooked gambling game could recover in a
civil action.”); Catts v. Phalen, 43 U.S. 376, 381 (1844) (holding that lottery
operators can recover amounts paid to individual who fixed the drawing through “a
deeply concocted, deliberate, gross, and most wicked fraud”); Hobbs v. Boatright,
93 S.W. 934 (Mo. 1906) (recognizing common law causes of action for fraud and
conspiracy to recover losses stemming from fixed footrace); Stewart v. Wright, 147
F. 321 (8th Cir. 1906) (similar); see also Zaika v. Del E. Webb Corp., 508 F. Supp.
1005, 1008 (D. Nev. 1981) (citing Berman and recognizing a fraud action for losses
caused by cheating); State Gaming Control Bd. v. Breen, 661 P.2d 1309, 1310
(Nev. 1983) (distinguishing action to recover alleged keno winnings from Berman
and Zaika but citing them with approval) but see Babcock v. Thompson, 20 Mass.
446, 449 (1826) (“Clearly if the gaming had been fair, the law would give no
remedy. The only question then is, whether the fraud will alter the case. We think it
112
113
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impacted by cheating as forming no illegal contract at all118—the bets were a
nullity or void ab initio119—and courts did not construe cheated losses as true
unrecoverable “gaming debts.”120 For example, the Supreme Court of North
Carolina held in 1843
that money, fairly lost at play at a forbidden game and paid, cannot be
recovered back in an action for money had and received. But it is perfectly
certain, that money, won by cheating at any kind of game, whether allowed or
forbidden, and paid by the loser without a knowledge of the fraud, may be
121
recovered.

The availability of common law fraud claims—and the distinction between
money exchanged in a legitimate (or square) game and money lost as a result of
cheating—persisted through the creation of modern regulatory regimes.122 The
Ninth Circuit’s decision in Erickson v. Desert Palace, Inc. is an illustration.
There, a casino refused to pay a slot machine jackpot won by a minor.123 After
unsuccessfully exhausting administrative remedies and seeking judicial review
in state court, the minor’s parents filed a second action in federal court alleging
(among other things) breach of contract, quasi-contract, fraud, and cheating.124
The casino moved to dismiss, citing Nevada statutes that largely mirror the
common law unenforceability of “gaming debts” and that restrict actions to
recover certain gaming debts to an administrative review process.125 The
will not.”); Bradley v. Doherty, 106 Cal. Rptr. 725, 726 (Ct. App. 1973) (stating the
general rule that California courts will not enforce illegal betting contract applies
even if the winner wins by fraud or deceit) (citing Abbe v. Marr, 14 Cal. 210, 211
(1859)).
118
See Webb v. Fulchire, 25 N.C. 485, 487 (1843) (“Such a transaction cannot for
a moment be regarded as a wager, depending on a future and uncertain event; but it
was only a pretended wager”).
119
Criswell v. Gaster, 5 Mart.(n.s.) 129, 131–32 (La. 1826) (“The aleatory contract
was clearly simulated and feigned, and although intended to defraud, it could
legally produce no effect; nothing could have been lost on it, and consequently
nothing could be won. . ..the contract must be considered as void ab initio. . ..”).
120
See Grim v. Cheatwood, 257 P.2d 1049, 1051 (Okla. 1953) (“Plaintiffs’ action
is not an action to recover losses sustained in a gambling game.”); Lockman v.
Cobb, 91 S.W. 546, 550 (Ark. 1905) (“There was no uncertain event to constitute a
wager. It was determined and understood what the result of the pretended race
would be before it was made. By fraud and deceit they caused him to make a
pretended wager and robbed him of his money, pretending that he had lost it.”); see
also Erickson v. Desert Palace, Inc., 942 F.2d 694, 696 (9th Cir. 1991)
(characterizing actions to collect unpaid winnings as a “gaming debt” and
distinguishing between actions to recover losses sustained in a “crooked” game).
121
Webb, 25 N.C. at 486.
122
Rose, supra note 3, at 629 (“It is important to note that these changes in the law
on the collectability of gambling debts did not change the common law of
Nevada. . .there is nothing in these statutes to indicate that the Nevada legislature
meant to overturn the Statute of Anne.”).
123
Erickson, 942 F.2d at 694–95.
124
Id. at 694–97.
125
See id. at 695–96 (citing NRS 463.361; NRS 463.361–NRS 463.366; NRS
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parents tried to avoid the unenforceability bar, and the prior unfavorable
outcome of the administrative proceeding, by invoking the common law
exception for fraud claims.126 They argued that the casino’s refusal to pay the
jackpot amounted to fraud and did not involve a “gaming debt” confined to
administrative remedies.127
The Ninth Circuit disagreed. It clarified that the common law “provides for
a cause of action for fraud to recover losses sustained in a gambling
transaction.”128 The court indicated that the enactment of the gaming statutes,
and the creation of the administrative process, did not abrogate the common
law rule that a party can file a civil fraud action to recover losses suffered from
cheating.129 Instead, the statutes reflect the common law understanding that
unpaid winnings from a legitimate game—including slot machine jackpots—
are considered “gaming debts,” and those debts are now only enforceable
through the administrative process, if at all.130 Because the parents sued for the
amount that the minor would have won had he been old enough to play, not an
amount lost from cheating, their suit was actually for a “gaming debt,” and they
were restricted to administrative remedies.131 The court summarized that
“parties who assert they are owed a gaming debt, fraud or no fraud, are
confined to the administrative process followed by state judicial review.”132
A Third Circuit Court of Appeals decision interpreting New Jersey law and
the CCA aligns with the Ninth Circuit’s opinion in Erickson. In Mankodi v.
Trump, a patron sued a casino over a hand of blackjack.133 The patron bet
$3,700 and, after he was dealt an ace, the dealer rescinded the hand.134 Gaming
regulators later ruled that the dealer illegally withdrew the hand.135 Thereafter,
the patron sued the casino asserting a laundry list of claims, including breach of
contract and fraud.136 The Third Circuit, like the Ivey court’s motion to dismiss
463.3662- NRS 463.3668); see also Zoggolis v. Wynn Las Vegas, LLC, 768 F.3d
919, 921 (9th Cir. 2014) (“This part of the statute is consistent with the commonlaw prohibition against enforcement of gaming debts.”).
126
Erickson, 942 F.2d at 696.
127
Id.
128
Id. at 696.
129
See id. at 696–97.
130
See id. at 695–97.
131
Id. at 696–97; see also Mattes v. Ballys Las Vegas, 227 F. App’x 567, 572 (9th
Cir. 2007) (“Mattes’ claim falls clearly within this category, because he is
attempting to recover a gaming debt allegedly owed, which he argues he
legitimately won or would have won.”); Devon v. Unbelievable, Inc., 29 F.3d 631
(9th Cir. 1994) (unpublished) (unpaid slot machine jackpot winnings considered a
“gaming debt” and patron must exhaust administrative remedies).
132
Erickson, 942 F.2d at 697.
133
Mankodi v. Trump Marina Assocs., LLC, 525 F. App’x 161, 162 (3d Cir.
2013).
134
Id.
135
Id. at 163.
136
Id. at 163, 164–67.
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ruling, affirmed dismissal of the patron’s breach of contract claim as a
disguised attempt to privately enforce the CCA.137 But the court substantively
addressed the patron’s fraud allegations and did not consider them preempted
or covered by the CCA.138 By entertaining the fraud allegations outside the
administrative process, the Third Circuit adhered to the common law rule that a
victim of gaming fraud may seek recourse in court. Even the Ivey court initially
conceded that it was unlikely that “the New Jersey legislature intended that
casinos could be victimized by fraud and thereafter bar them, indirectly, from
seeking redress in the courts, even if the fraud arose in the context of a
regulated game, the rules of which are designed by state regulation.”139
Against this background, the Ivey court’s reliance on a breach of contract
theory appears misplaced. As the court originally acknowledged, the CCA did
not preempt all common law claims or create a cause of action that did not
otherwise exist.140 Under the common law, there was no contract action to
recover cheated losses—fraud was the proper claim for victims of cheating.
And even though the New Jersey courts take an apparently broad view of the
issues that litigants must first present to gaming regulators,141 a properly framed
and supported fraud claim does not need to be referred to regulators before
filing in court.142
B. The Fraudulent Act is Entering the Wager Without the Intent to Honor the
Rules of Play.
The Ivey court’s resort to a contractual theory of liability may be a
symptom of misunderstanding the features of the gaming contract and the
nature of a cheating patron’s fraudulent misrepresentation. Laboring under
those misunderstandings, the court strained to distinguish the bases of
contractual and tort liability and stretched to find a fraudulent act distinct from
the breach of the gaming contract. Without an explanation, the Ivey court
seemingly drew the dividing line between statutory provisions, as “primary

Id. at 166. In a footnote, the Ivey court disagreed with what it described as the
Mankodi court’s summary dismissal of “a plaintiff’s claim against a casino because
his claims required an interpretation of the CCA.” Ivey I, supra note 30, at 339 n.8.
138
See Mankodi, 525 Fed. App’x at 166–67 & n.5 (noting one judge would have
found the fraud claim preempted along with the contract claim); see also notes
167–68 & accompanying text (describing the nature of the fraud claim at issue in
Mankodi).
139
Ivey I, supra note 30, at 338 n.5.
140
Id. at 337–38 & n.5.
141
See id. at 338–39 & n.8 (citing Campione v. Adamar of N.J., Inc., 714 A.2d
299, 308 (N.J. 1998); Golden Nugget, 2015 WL 689437).
142
Mankodi, 525 F. App’x at 166–67; Erickson, 942 F.2d at 696; cf. Smerling v.
Harrah’s Entm’t, Inc., 912 A.2d 168, 172 (N.J. Super. App. Div. 2006) (explaining
the difference between primary and exclusive jurisdiction and surveying the types
of common law causes of action that must first go to gaming regulators).
137
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obligations,” and game rules, as secondary obligations.143 Under the court’s
framework, the CCA is part of the gaming contract so that a breach of contract
claim exists for a violation of its statutory provisions, but, unlike the CCA,
Baccarat’s game rules are not part of the gaming contract so that a
representation in conflict with the game rules can be an independent basis for a
fraud claim.144 The court’s arbitrary exclusion of the game rules from the terms
of the gaming contract and convoluted analysis of Borgata’s fraud claim
overlook several fundamental elements of gaming law.
Each wager between a casino and a patron forms a contract.145 The patron
makes the contractual offer by placing the wager, and the casino accepts the
patron’s offer by acknowledging the bet or simply starting the game.146 In the
fast-paced gaming environment, contract formation generally occurs in a matter
of seconds without any negotiation over the terms of the contract.147 As a
result, the statutes and regulations that dictate game play supply the gaming
contract’s specific terms.148 These statutes and regulations are the default rules
for the games, and the Ivey court correctly determined that they also act as the
default terms of the gaming contract.149
Ivey II, supra note 5, at *11.
See id.; see also Ivey III, supra note 78, at *1 (“The Court determined that Ivey
and Sun breached their primary obligation to not use marked cards in violation of
the CCA, which constituted a breach of contract to abide by the CCA.”); Id. at *1
n.2. (“The Court found in favor of Ivey and Sun on Borgata’s claim that the edgesorting scheme constituted fraud because Ivey and Sun did not violate the rules of
Baccarat, and Borgata did not rely upon a material misrepresentation.”).
145
Anthony Cabot & Robert Hannum, Advantage Play and Commercial Casinos,
74 Miss. L.J. 681, 722 (2005).
146
Id. at 723–24; ANTHONY N. CABOT AND KEITH C. MILLER, THE LAW OF
GAMBLING AND REGULATED GAMING 202 n.1 (2011); see also Jordan T. Smith,
The Iowa Supreme Court’s Flawed Application of Gaming Law Principles in
Blackford v. Prairie Meadows Racetrack and Casino, 17 GAMING L. REV. & ECON.
275, 277–79 (2013) (analyzing the Iowa Supreme Court’s erroneous conclusion
that the casino is the offeror).
147
See Cabot & Hannum, supra note 145, at 722 (noting “[c]asino style wagering
is essentially an adhesion contract between the casino and its patrons.”); see also
Tose v. Greate Bay Hotel & Casino Inc., 819 F. Supp. 1312, 1316 n.8 (D. N.J.
1993) (stating “there is little freedom of contract in the usual sense” as “every
aspect of the relationship between the gambler and the casino is minutely regulated
by the state”).
148
Cabot & Hannum, supra note 145, at 726; see also Blackford v. Prairie
Meadows Racetrack & Casino, Inc., 778 N.W.2d 184, 189 (Iowa 2010) (stating
statutory and regulatory restrictions are part of the parties’ gaming contract).
149
See Ivey I, supra note 30, at 336 (“It follows then that contractual agreements,
whether express or implied, governing casino gambling in New Jersey include a
provision that both parties agree to abide by the CCA.”). But because statutes and
regulations are game rules, the Ivey court’s conclusion that “none of the actual rules
of Baccarat were broken” is inaccurate. Ivey II, supra note 5, at *9. If edge sorting
is cheating, and violates a statute, then, by definition, Ivey broke the rules of the
game. It also appears that the parties violated baccarat’s game rules for another
reason. Subchapters 3 and 4 of the New Jersey Administrative Code § 69F set forth
143
144

SMITH FORMATTED 5.22.17.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

Summer 2017]

CHEATER’S JUSTICE

5/30/17 2:23 PM

77

However, the Ivey court failed to consider that written game rules
displayed at the gaming area, and unwritten rules established by custom,
tradition, and common understanding, may impose additional contractual
terms.150 For instance, slot machine signage may set a maximum payout or
describe the jackpot symbol alignment.151 Likewise, the statutes, regulations, or
rules governing craps may not explicitly disclose that a patron loses if he rolls a
seven after establishing a point number, but this rule is commonly
understood.152 These written and unwritten game rules are also part of the
gaming contract just like statutes and regulations.153 And it is beyond serious
debate that “don’t cheat” is, at minimum, an unwritten rule of every game—and
is part of every gaming contract—even if there is no statute, regulation, or
written rule expressly prohibiting it.154
But the incorporation of game rules and anti-cheating provisions into the
gaming contract does not mean that a contractual theory of liability necessarily
subsumes all actions to recover cheated losses. It is well accepted that “the
failure to fulfill a promise to perform in the future may give rise to a fraud
claim if the promisor ‘had no intention to perform at the time the promise was
made.’”155 The Restatement (Second) of Torts explains that this rule “is true
whether or not the promise is enforceable as a contract.”156 If the contract is
void or unenforceable—like early American courts treated gaming contracts
afflicted by cheating—the injured party’s sole remedy is an action in deceit.157
On the other hand, if the gaming contract is enforceable—and prohibitions on
cheating are incorporated into the contractual terms through statutes,
regulations, or game rules—”the person misled by the representation has a
cause of action in tort as an alternative at least, and perhaps in some instances
the state’s rules for Baccarat and those provisions seem inconsistent with the
conduct of Borgata and Ivey. See N.J. ADMIN. CODE § 69F Subchapters 3 and 4,
http://www.nj.gov/oag/ge/docs/Regulations/CHAPTER69F.pdf (last visited May
15, 2017). The Ivey court did not address these regulations.
150
See Cabot & Hannum, supra note 145, at 725.
151
See, e.g., McKee v. Isle of Capri Casinos, Inc., 864 N.W.2d 518, 527 (Iowa
2015) (“We agree with the district court that the Miss Kitty [slot machine] rules of
the game are the relevant contract here and that they form an express contract.”);
Macon Cty. Greyhound Park, Inc. v. Knowles, 39 So. 3d 100, 110 (Ala. 2009)
(“Thus, we hold that the terms that were necessary and indispensable to the
formation of an enforceable contract between Victoryland and Knowles were the
rules of the wager incorporated into the help screens and pay tables of [the]
machine”); Eash v. Imperial Palace of Miss., LLC, 4 So. 3d 1042, 1048 (Miss.
2009) (stating that game rules posted on slot machine were the relevant contractual
terms).
152
Cabot & Hannum, supra note 145, at 725.
153
Id.
154
See id.
155
See, e.g., Cundiff v. Dollar Loan Ctr. LLC, 726 F. Supp. 2d 1232, 1241 (D.
Nev. 2010) (quoting Bulbman, Inc. v. Nev. Bell, 825 P.2d 588, 592 (Nev. 1992)).
156
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 530 cmt. c (1977).
157
See id.
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in addition to his cause of action on the contract.”158
In U.S. ex rel. O’Donnell v. Countrywide Home Loans, Inc., the Second
Circuit Court of Appeals recently examined in exhaustive detail common law
fraud claims and their interaction with contract law.159 It concurred with the
Ivey court’s assessment “that a breach of contract alone is not fraud.”160 The
Second Circuit observed that “the common law does not permit a fraud claim
based solely on contractual breach; at the same time, a contractual relationship
between the parties does not wholly remove a party’s conduct from the scope
of fraud.”161 The relevant inquiry “is when the representations were made and
the intent of the promisor at that time.”162 “[A]t common law,” the court
continued, “a post-agreement intent to breach the contract is not actionable as
fraud.”163 “Failure to comply with a contractual obligation is only fraudulent
when the promisor never intended to honor the contract.”164 The Second Circuit
pointed out that direct proof of fraudulent intent is rare and usually comes from
inferential or circumstantial evidence.165 “In sum,” the court concluded, “a
contractual promise can only support a claim for fraud upon proof of fraudulent
intent not to perform the promise at the time of contract execution. Absent such
proof, a subsequent breach of that promise—even where willful and
intentional—cannot in itself transform the promise into a fraud.”166
Applying these principles to the gaming context, there exists a common
law fraud action to recover cheated losses—even though wagers are contracts
with express or implied anti-cheating provisions—where a patron places a bet
without intending to abide by his obligation to play by the rules. The Third
Circuit’s Mankodi blackjack case, discussed above, correctly applied this rule.
That court affirmed the dismissal of the patron’s fraud claims because the
complaint insufficiently pleaded “facts showing that the Casino intended to
rescind the blackjack hand at the time it represented that it would play it.”167
The court reasoned that “[a]lthough the Casino later did rescind the hand, we
may not ‘infer fraudulent intent from mere nonperformance’ of a contract, as
Id.
822 F.3d 650, 656–62 (2d Cir. 2016).
160
Compare Ivey II, supra note 5, at *12 with O’Donnell, 822 F.3d 650, 658 (2d
Cir. 2016); see also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 530 cmt. d (1977) (“The
intention of the promisor not to perform an enforceable or unenforceable agreement
cannot be established solely by proof of its nonperformance. . . .”).
161
O’Donnell, 822 F.3d at 658.
162
Id.
163
Id. at 659. A claim for breach of contract or breach of the implied covenant of
good faith and fair dealing may be appropriate when a party first decides to cheat
during play (after the wager has been offered and accepted).
164
Id. at 660 (quotations omitted).
165
Id. at 659.
166
Id. at 662.
167
Mankodi v. Trump Marina Assocs., LLC, 525 F. App’x 161, 166-67 (3d Cir.
2013) (emphasis added).
158
159
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doing so would ‘eviscerate the distinction between a breach of contract and
fraud.’”168 To state a gaming fraud claim, the plaintiff must plead facts
demonstrating that the defendant did not intend to play by the rules when it
offered or accepted the wager.169
From an evidentiary standpoint, there will often be direct or circumstantial
proof beyond the act of cheating itself that demonstrates the cheater did not
intend, at contract formation, to perform his contractual obligation to play by
the rules. For example, in Grim v. Cheatwood, the plaintiff lost money in a
sham poker game and recovered in a fraud action based on evidence of pregame “collusion and collaboration” between the defendant and “two of his
cohorts” to mark cards and cheat the plaintiff out of $1,000. 170 There was
similar evidence in Hobbs v. Boatright where a jury found overwhelming proof
of a long-running, elaborate con to entice wealthy individuals to participate in
fixed footraces.171 Lockman v. Cobb is another case involving rigged footraces
where the court emphasized evidence of “a previous understanding” that one of
the runners would intentionally fall down.172
Criminal prosecutions of cheaters provide other examples. Indeed, the Ivey
court noted the similarities between civil and criminal fraud actions.173 In
Sheriff of Washoe County v. Martin, authorities arrested the defendant and
charged him with cheating in violation of Nevada’s gaming statutes.174 The
prosecution alleged that the defendant sat at a blackjack table next to a known
card crimper who, after tampering with the cards, signaled to the defendant
how the defendant should play his hand.175 Both the defendant and card
crimper varied their betting patterns when new decks of un-crimped cards
rotated into play.176 After the preliminary hearing, the defendant filed a writ of
habeas corpus arguing that the cheating statutes were unconstitutionally
vague.177
On appeal, the Nevada Supreme Court upheld the statutes and affirmed the

Id. at 167 (quoting United States v. D’Amato, 39 F.3d 1249, 1261 n.8 (2d
Cir.1994)); see also Ocean Cape Hotel Corp. v. Masefield Corp., 164 A.2d 607,
613–14 (N.J. Super Ct. App. Div. 1960) (holding that a “false state of mind” when
making the promise may give rise to actionable fraud provided there is evidence to
establish fraudulent intent beyond the mere nonperformance of the contract).
169
See Mankodi, 525 F. App’x at 167 (citing Jewish Ctr. of Sussex Cnty. v. Whale,
432 A.2d 521, 524 (N.J. 1981); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 56:8–2 (requiring a
“concealment, suppression or omission” for statutory fraud liability)).
170
257 P.2d 1049, 1049 (1953).
171
93 S.W. 934, 934–36 (1906).
172
91 S.W. 546, 550 (1905).
173
Ivey II, supra note 5, at *10 n.19.
174
662 P.2d 634, 635–36 (Nev. 1983) (citing NRS §§ 465.015, 465.083, 199.480).
175
Id. at 636.
176
Id.
177
Id.
168

SMITH FORMATTED 5.22.17.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

80

UNLV GAMING LAW JOURNAL

5/30/17 2:23 PM

[Vol. 7:61

decision to bind over the defendant.178 The court highlighted that the legislature
did not intend “to remove from the crime of cheating the requirement of
fraudulent intent” and the court had “consistently drawn parallels between
cheating and fraudulent conduct.”179 The court held that “if a player or dealer
deceitfully alters the identifying characteristics or attributes of a game with the
intent to deprive another of money or property by affecting the otherwise
established probabilities of the game’s various outcomes, he or she is guilty of
cheating within the meaning of [the statutes].”180 The court’s analysis
distinguished card counters181 from card crimpers because crimpers illegally
alter a characteristic of the game and eliminate the element of chance, while
card counters merely use mental skills to take advantage of information that is
equally available to everyone.182 As for the defendant, the court found
sufficient evidence of fraudulent intent, even though he did not crimp the cards
himself, based on his conversation with the card crimper while playing, the
card crimper’s signaling, and the defendant’s suspicious betting patterns
between crimped and un-crimped decks.183
In Ivey’s case, if edge sorting is actually cheating,184 there was ample
evidence of pre-contract formation fraudulent intent aside from the act of edge
sorting. Ivey requested the five conditions so that he could successfully edge
sort, and those requests indicate that he intended to ignore the rules of play
before making any wager. One could also infer from Ivey’s request to play with
Sun that there was a prior agreement between the two to cheat, as with the
fraudsters in Grim, Hobbs, and Lockman. And, like the defendant in Martin,
Ivey varied his betting patterns—his contractual offers—to exploit the
advantage of edge sorting.185 The court found that Ivey bet small until the entire

Id. at 638.
Id. (citing, among others, Berman v. Riverside Casino Corp., 247 F. Supp. 243,
251 (D. Nev. 1964), aff’d, 354 F.2d 43 (9th Cir. 1965) (knowledge and control are
minimum requirements for imposing civil or criminal liability under statute
prohibiting act of allowing operation of any cheating or thieving game or device)).
180
Id.
181
In another case, Chen v. Nevada State Gaming Control Bd., 994 P.2d 1151,
1151–53 (Nev. 2000), the Nevada Supreme Court determined that a card counter
using a fake passport did not commit fraud because the casino did not detrimentally
rely on the passport when it allowed the card counter to play. Nor was the fake
passport the proximate cause of the casino’s damages—the patron’s skill was the
proximate cause. Id. at 1152.
182
Martin, 662 P.2d at 638.
183
See id. at 636–38. The Nevada Supreme Court relied on similar evidence to
uphold the cheating conviction in Skipper v. State, 879 P.2d 732, 732–33 (Nev.
1994) where a dice slider changed his method of throwing the dice to conceal his
attempts to slide, altered his betting pattern, and used a partner to block the dealer’s
view.
184
See Ivey II, supra note 5, at *6-7; see Schweitzer, supra note 62; see also
Hollander, supra note 62.
185
Ivey II, supra note 5, at *4.
178
179
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shoe was sorted and, once the sorting was complete, he bet the maximum
amount on every hand.186 Even without considering the act of edge sorting,
these circumstances demonstrate that neither Ivey nor Sun placed a wager with
the intent to play by the rules. Quite the opposite. They never intended to honor
their promise not to cheat when entering each gaming contract.
Properly conceptualized, it was unnecessary for the Ivey court to
manufacture a separate basis for a fraud claim by excluding Baccarat’s game
rules from the terms of the gaming contract. Statutory, regulatory, and rulesbased prohibitions on cheating are integral parts of the gaming contract. Still,
victims of cheating possess a viable fraud claim to recover losses—despite the
contractual nature of a wager—where the player places a bet without intending
to play by the rules.
IV. CALCULATION OF DAMAGES
No matter the theory of liability adopted, the Ivey court erred by rejecting
Borgata’s damage calculation using its statistical advantage or expected win
probability. Both tort and contract law agree that parties to a gaming
transaction can recover damages based on their statistical chance of winning
when the odds are defined or ascertainable to a reasonable degree of certainty.
In tort actions, like those sounding in fraud, a party may recover damages based
on its probabilistic injury or loss of chance of winning a prize. The Restatement
(Second) of Torts provides that an injured party can recover in “[c]ases in
which the plaintiff is wrongfully deprived of the expectancy of winning a race
or a contest, when he has had a substantial certainty or at least a high
probability of success.”187 The Restatement contains two illustrations to
illuminate the point:
[T]he plaintiff is entered in a contest for a large cash prize to be awarded to
the person who, during a given time limit, obtains the largest number of
subscriptions to a magazine. At a time when the contest has one week more to
run and the plaintiff is leading all other competitors by a margin of two to one,
the defendant unjustifiably strikes the plaintiff out of the contest and rules him
ineligible. In such a case there may be sufficient certainty established so that
the plaintiff may successfully maintain an action for loss of the prospective
188
benefits.
A is one of the three remaining contestants for a prize to be awarded in a
newspaper popularity contest, all three remaining contestants having received
substantially the same number of votes. For the purpose of discrediting A, B, a
friend of one of the other contestants, causes A to be arrested, thus destroying
A’s chance of winning the prize, $3000. Assuming that there was more than a
mere possibility that A might have won the prize, A is entitled to damages

Id.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS Nine 37A Spec. Note (1979); see also
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 912 cmt. f (1979).
188
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS Nine 37A Spec. Note (1979).
186
187
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from B based on the value of the chance that he would have received the prize,
189
that is, in the absence of further evidence, $1000.

These examples allowed recovery because the plaintiff’s chance of
winning was sufficiently certain. By contrast, there may be cases where the
odds of winning are too fluid or uncertain to use probabilistic-injury theory. For
instance, the Restatement (Second) of Torts indicates that the chances of
winning a horserace may be too speculative to permit recovery.190 But where
the odds of a gambling game are defined, probabilistic-injury theory is an
appropriate measure of damages. The best example comes from Judge Richard
Posner of the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals in Milam v. Dominick’s Finer
Foods, Inc.:191
Suppose you’re playing roulette on a 37-number wheel (18 red, 18 black, and
1 green) at the Casino de Monte-Carlo, and after you have placed your $1,000
bet on red, which will pay you $2,000 if the ball lands on red, the casino
collapses through the negligence of a building contractor, destroying not only
the roulette wheel but also your chips, and you cannot get the money you paid
for them back because all the casino’s records were destroyed when it
collapsed. You’ve suffered a loss equal to a 48.6 percent chance of winning
192
$2,000. So $972.73 would be your damages.

Judge Posner’s hypothetical demonstrates that the patron could rely on
roulette’s set odds to mathematically calculate his potential damages to a
reasonable degree of certainty.193 If the Ivey court had correctly conceived
Borgata’s fraud claim, Borgata should have been able to recover its loss of
chance damages based on its established house edge in Baccarat and the
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 912 cmt. f Illus. 16 (1979).
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS Nine 37A Spec. Note (1979) (“On the other
hand, if the plaintiff has a horse entered in a race and the defendant wrongfully
prevents him from running, there may well not be sufficient certainty to entitle the
plaintiff to recover.”); see also Youst v. Longo, 729 P.2d 728, 737 (Cal. 1987)
(“[T]he winner of a horserace is not always the leader throughout the race for a
horse can ‘break the pack’ at any point in the race, even as a matter of strategy.
Further, many races are won by a ‘nose.’ Thus, no cause of action exists for
interference with this horseracing event.”).
191
588 F.3d 955 (7th Cir. 2009). The Author has previously criticized Judge
Posner’s roulette example because it fails to consider gaming statutes, regulations,
and rules of play that terminate the spin (and gaming contract) as soon as a foreign
object falls into the wheel. Jordan T. Smith, No Spin: Why Judge Posner’s Roulette
Player Can Recover his Orange Chip, 15 GAMING L. REV. & ECON. 693 (2011).
The Author’s critique does not undermine the application of probabilistic injury
theory to the gaming context.
192
Milam, 588 F.3d at 958.
193
Judge Posner’s example also demonstrates that a patron cheated by a casino
would be wiser to rely on restitutionary damages to recover the amount wagered.
See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 901 (1979) (setting forth the general
principles of tort damages as including “compensation, indemnity or restitution for
harms”). The odds of every gambling game favor the house so a cheated patron’s
use of probabilistic injury theory will always result in a recovery lower than the
amount actually bet.
189
190

SMITH FORMATTED 5.22.17.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

Summer 2017]

5/30/17 2:23 PM

CHEATER’S JUSTICE

83

amount that Ivey bet on each hand. The standard house advantage in Baccarat
is 1.06% for banker bets and 1.24% for player bets.194 Applying those
percentages to the amount Ivey bet, the court was able to calculate that Borgata
was entitled to an additional $5,418.311.40.195 Thus, the amount of Borgata’s
damages was mathematically certain.
The mere presence of Lady Luck does not render probabilistic-injury
theory too speculative. In another case using his roulette hypothetical as an
example, Judge Posner explains that luck-based “deviation[s] would matter. . .if
the victim of a fraud had to prove his loss with mathematical exactitude. He
does not.”196 Statistical calculations are enough when supported by adequate
evidence.197 And if there is any uncertainty, “doubts should be resolved against
the wrongdoer [o]therwise the more grievous the wrong done, the less
likelihood there would be of a recovery.”198
The Ivey court should have adopted this type of calculation even under its
contractual theory of liability. The Restatement (Second) of Contracts provides
that
[i]f a breach is of a promise conditioned on a fortuitous event and it is
uncertain whether the event would have occurred had there been no breach,
the injured party may recover damages based on the value of the conditional
199
right at the time of breach.

Under this rule, an injured party to an aleatory200 contract “has the
alternative remedy of damages based on the value of his conditional contract
right at the time of breach, or what may be described as the value of his ‘chance
of winning.’”201 Modifying the Restatement (Second) of Torts’ horseracing
example, the Restatement (Second) of Contracts allows a bettor to recover:
A offers a $100,000 prize to the owner whose horse wins a race at A’s track. B
accepts by entering his horse and paying the registration fee. When the race is
run, A wrongfully prevents B’s horse from taking part. Although B cannot
prove that his horse would have won the race, he can prove that it was
considered to have one chance in four of winning because one fourth of the
money bet on the race was bet on his horse. B has a right to damages of
202
$25,000 based on the value of the conditional right to the prize.

Ivey III, supra note 78, at *3 n.6.
Id.
196
BCS Servs., Inc. v. Heartwood 88, LLC, 637 F.3d 750, 760 (7th Cir. 2011).
197
Id.
198
Id. at 759 (internal citations and quotations omitted).
199
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 348(3) (1981).
200
“An aleatory contract is one in which at least one party is under a duty that is
conditional on the occurrence of an event that, so far as the parties to the contract
are aware, is dependent on chance . . . . Common examples are contracts of
insurance and suretyship, as well as gambling contracts.” RESTATEMENT (SECOND)
OF CONTRACTS § 379 cmt. a (1981).
201
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 348 cmt. d (1981).
202
Id. at cmt. d Illus. 5.
194
195
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Again, the presence of set or defined odds facilitates recovery. Therefore,
even under a contractual theory of liability, the court should have permitted
Borgata to recover the value of its chance of winning as established by its
statistical advantage in Baccarat.
V. CONCLUSION
The available remedies for victims of cheating have advanced considerably
over time. Instead of breaking kneecaps (or worse), most parties duped in a
gambling game are now able to seek recourse in a civil action for fraud without
being limited to administrative remedies. And while the Ivey court mistakenly
limited Borgata to a breach of contract theory, victims of cheating can state a
viable fraud claim if they possess evidence—aside from the act of cheating
itself—that the cheater never intended to play by the rules when he entered the
gaming contract. Under either theory of liability, parties cheated at gambling
can recover damages based on their statistical chance of winning. After all,
every gambler knows, deep down, that the odds of each game are established to
such a degree of mathematical certainty that the house will win in the long run.

